II. What is a Military National Security Case?
The UCMJ allows for assimilating and charging federal law violations.
3 But the military only does so when there is not an applicable punitive UCMJ article. Thus, almost all military national security cases only involve violation(s) of military law. There are several articles of the UCMJ the violation of which would almost always be considered a national security case, and there are other articles the violation of which may qualify based on the details or context of an individual case. 4 The articles of the UCMJ which presumptively yield a national security case include:
Article io 4 -Aiding the Enemy: This charge encompasses servicemembers who aid or attempt to aid the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies or other things.
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Article io6-Spies: This charge encompasses spying. It's more a notional than practical charge as the punishment is per se unconstitutional. The mandatory punishment for someone convicted of spying is death. 6 Article io6a-Espionage: A servicemember violates this article in much the same way as a violation of Article 104. The key distinction is that Article 104 involves an enemy (any hostile body that the U.S. military is opposing), whereas espionage involves a foreign enemy against whom the U.S. is not engaged in armed conflict. 7 Other military prosecutions involve facially neutral charges and qualify as national security cases on an individual basis. Examples include the 2013 court-martial of Private First Class Bradley Manning for aiding the enemy in violation of Article 104 and then a host of violations of Article 92 (failure to obey a lawful order or regulation) stemming from his role in providing information to WikiLeaks. The Article 104 charge is a per se national security charge, but you would need to know the context of the Article 92 violations in order to say the same of them. The vast majority of the time Article 92 violations have nothing to do with national security, so context is key. In Manning's case the Article 92 charges referred to his violating the Army's regulation on information assurance, which details how to properly store, protect, and transmit unclassified and classified information. Manning violated the regulation, and thus Article 92, by wrongfiflly moving classified files, cables, videos, and presentations from a secure government system onto his personal computer, a nonsecure system. Similarly, when two U.S. servicemembers attacked and killed fellow servicemembers in separate incidents-in Kuwait shortly before the United States invaded Iraq in 20o3, 8 and at Ft. Hood, Texas, in 2oo 9 9-the U.S. Army charged both with murder and attempted murder under the UCMJ. It is the context of these crimes-that the servicemember defendants were Muslim and purportedly acting in support of the Islamic extremist groups the United States was fighting and against U.S. servicemembers either in, or preparing to deploy to, the Middle East-that renders these prosecutions national security cases.' 0 Thus, the military will, on rare occasion, prosecute a servicemember for UMCJ violations that presumptively and/or contextually render the process a national security case. The rarity of such proceedings is itself a challenge; the military prosecutor and defense counsel are very unlikely to have previously tried a case involving classified information. And although a court-martial need not technically involve classified information to constitute a national security case, the overwhelming majority of them do."
The introduction of classified information significantly alters the contours of a court-martial, before the proceedings, during the merits, on sentencing, and even posttrial and on appellate matters. In general classified information creates a tension that does not exist in other cases, between the competing values of the government's interest to protect national security information from disclosure and the accused's right to a fair trial. This tension is exacerbated in the military at the pretrial stage as the military practices open-file discovery, which is made functionally impossible in the need-to-know environment of classified information. Further, the presence of classified information, and the difficulty in correlating degrees of potential harm to national security to a level of punishment in the absence of sentencing guidelines, both add complexity to the sentencing process in these cases.
Ill. Sentencing Complexities in National Security Cases
Classified information often poses the largest challenge in sentencing. The challenges begin before trial with the byzantine manner by which material is determined to be classified and only increases when the material is introduced in court. Concern about safeguarding classified material dictates any number of aspects of the conduct of sentencing proceedings. And a mistake regarding handling of classified evidence is at best glaring hypocrisy 2 and may even constitute a criminal violation. The process by which information is reviewed and accessed to determine whether it's classified is beyond the scope of this chapter. And there is an entirely differently process by which unclassified governmental information the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the public interest is privileged.' 6 Suffice to say both are cumbersome and slow processes, made more so when the entity making the determination is outside the DOD. The processes are so onerous that sometimes defense counsel will seek to include classified information in a proceeding as a form of leverage against the prosecution, a technique known as "graymail."' 7 And yet the complexities only increase following a determination that relevant information is classified and introduced in court. Table i highlights the differences and similarities between how the different federal criminal forums-federal court, military courtsmartial, and military commissions-treat classified information.
B. Impact of Classified Information on Sentencing Process
The complexities include dictating which courtrooms may and may not be used, a host of requirements on counsel for both sides, and even how the military judge, court personnel, witnesses, and the panel (military jury) operate.
The starting point for understanding the enormous complexity added by the introduction of classified information is to recognize that all personnel and facilities must be cleared to handle or receive classified information. Thus security managers must inspect and approve the courtroom itself as a location in which classified information may be discussed and stored. In terms of personnel, although many servicemembers possess security clearances, many do not. And civilian witnesses or counsel generally don't have security clearances, which leads to considerable delays in the progress of the trial as counsel go through the clearance process. In addition to impacting where national security trials may be held and the personnel who may be involved, classified information dictates the conduct of the trial. Classified information may only be introduced or discussed in dosed sessions, meaning that the only people present have the requisite security clearance and need to know the information being discussed. But given both the accused's and public's rights to a public trial, the military judge may close the courtroom for only those portions that involve classified information.' 8 This leads to both advocacy and organizational challenges for counsel and the military judge.
To limit the number of times the courtroom needs to be closed and then reopened, most military judges require that each side introduce all unclassified information in one open session and then all the classified information in one closed session. The result is that unless a witness's testimony is either completely undassified or completely lassified, their testimony is bifurcated. Likewise, to the extent counsel's sentencing arguments involve classified information, counsel will need to make their unclassified argument in open court, and then that portion of their argument that involves classified evidence in a closed session. This presents challenges in terms of maintaining a coherent case presentation.
The military judge in a national security case is constantly striving for a balance-maintaining as much of the court-martial open to the public as possible while properly safeguarding classified information. One technique military judges will utilize is to have a security manager present in court. When in open session, the security manager will signal when either a question or part of a witness's testimony approaches or crosses the line of classified information. Both counsel and witnesses tend to become timid during discussion of any issue close to the classified boundary. Both counsel and witnesses start to build in long pauses between sentences and even in the middle of sentences to allow for the security manager to signal. The result is a process that safeguards classified information but can be an awkward and atypical example of military justice and advocacy, which is even more unfortunate as national security cases are more likely to be high-profile and involve media attention.
Counsel, court personnel, and jurors all must separate unclassified from classified information. That sounds straightforward enough, but the constant vigilance required by all involved, coupled with fear of a misstep, is taxing. For jurors, one technique is to have different colored notepads for unclassified and classified sessions. For counsel, ensuring the proper handling of classified material present in the courtroom involves meeting with a security manager before and after court to recover and redeposit the items from a safe. Ideally the prosecution and defense will each have their own safe for storage of classified material, but that's not always possible, which then creates additional challenges. On breaks during the proceedings, counsel must ensure that any classified information is appropriately safeguarded.
If counsel wish to use a computer to store notes, arguments, and other case-related material, if any of the material is classified, then the laptop must be certified to store such material. And unless and until the information is properly removed, the computer is considered a classified storage device and must be treated as such. This means not being able to leave the laptop unattended, storing it in a safe at a night, and not taking it home.
Members of the court staff are not immune from the challenges classified information presents. Similar to counsel's laptop, the court reporter must have any computer used to transcribe testimony during classified sessions certified, and once used the computer is then, and must be treated as, a classified storage device. Likewise, court staff members are responsible for the proper handling and storage of classified information admitted as evidence.
C. Determining Punishment
In many national security cases, reducing amorphous concepts like grave or serious damage to national security to how long the convicted servicemember should spend in confinement is yet another challenge. In cases like Anderson, where the accused was communicating with federal agents,. not al-Qaeda, no classified information ever reached the terrorist group. This leaves the military prosecutor to argue for punishment based on the accused's intent, but not actual harm following consummated acts. And the "victims" are often conceptual-the good order and discipline and morale of a military unit. Although those concepts are critically important, in advocacy terms they tend not to lend themselves as well to a sentencing arguments focusing on human victims.
Even in cases where the accused did convey information determined to be classified to an unauthorized person or entity, identifying the harm that directly resulted from the disclosure is difficult. In the Manning case, the prosecution called an intelligence expert to testify to the harm Manning's leak caused. For more than three hours he testified about the DOD's concerns that Manning's leaks "would erode trust between nations, between citizens and leaders, and between American soldiers and civilians in places like Afghanistan... 9 But on cross-examination he "could not cite specific data showing the effect of the leak on the number of foreign civilians and emissaries talking to the United States." 2 These challenges are made greater by the lack of military sentencing guidelines, which might serve as a base from which upward or downward departures would be considered.
2 Instead, for the vast majority of punitive articles of the UCMJ, there is no minimum mandated punishment.
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And for cases involving the per se national security charges of aiding the enemy or espionage, the potential punishment ranges from no punishment up to and including the death penalty. Such a range better allows for individualized sentencing. But it can also lead to wildly disparate sentences in different courts-martial for similar offenses.
IV. Conclusion
Military national security courts-martial infrequently occur. When they do occur, military counsel, judges, and court personnel endeavor to perform their function at a high level. Unfortunately, the process by which the U.S. government conducts classification reviews and the military's inexperience in national security cases often results in the form of safeguarding classified information trumping the substantive function of the underlying trial process. And by the time the sentencing phase is reached, understandable but unfortunate focus is placed on simply concluding the trial without mishandling classified information. 
Notes

4
DOJ faces a similar challenge. Some federal charges are per se national security cases, charges involving terrorism such as hijacking, whereas others are contextual, violent crimes, weapons violations, racketeering, and drug crimes, among them. This latter category may or may not constitute a national security case depending on the facts of the individual case. Federal prosecutions are straightforward enough that New York University issues a "Terrorist Trial Report Card" that breaks down the different kinds of possible national security cases in federal court. 
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Id. Asked directly by defense counsel whether he was aware of anyone harmed by Manning's disclosures, the intelligence expert first claimed to know of one Afghan national who had been killed by the Taliban, but later conceded that the name of the Afghan national was not among the documents Manning leaked. Id.
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See U.S. Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guidelines Manual, available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/ guidelines-manual. 22 Indeed, one defense tactic for striking prospective courtmartial panel (jury) members is to ask them whether, if they found the accused guilty, they could consider awarding a sentence of no punishment. For those that deny they could consider no punishment, military prosecutors will attempt to rehabilitate them by stressing that they are only required to consider no punishment and such consideration can be extremely brief.
